COMPETITIVE BARGAINING DELAYS 2011-2012 NBA SEASON

Like the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA) functions through the league’s owners agreeing to renewable contracts, or collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), with its players. Also like the NFL, the NBA’s recent agreement with its players association, the NBA Players’ Association (NBAPA), expired this past year, resulting in a bitter fight between the league’s players and owners. Unlike the NFL mediation, as the parties engaged in negotiations to create a new agreement, their respective hard-lined positional bargaining tactics caused the league to suffer a delayed start to its season that led to the cancellation of games.

The NBA’s most recent CBA was a six-year agreement, which began in 2005 and was to expire at the end of the 2011 season. NBA lockout timeline, NBA.com, (Sep 9, 2011, last updated Dec 9, 2011), nba.com. By the fall of 2010, and with the NBA season already underway, discussions to produce a new CBA had failed. Id. Both sides were adamantly opposed to backing down from their proposed revenue sharing schemes, and NBA Players’ Association President Billy Hunter warned that a lockout was highly likely for the following season. Id. In a lockout, league owners try to financially pressure the players in order to obtain the upper hand in labor negotiations since the players would be prevented from collecting payments under their contracts. NBA and NBAPA officials began meeting early in the 2011 calendar year in an attempt to avoid such an occurrence Id. As the months passed without an agreement, and with a lockout seeming imminent, the NBAPA filed suit to enjoin the league from implementing the lockout. Id. Being unsuccessful at court, the lockout began as the CBA expired at 12:01 a.m. on July 1st. Id.

In October, the NBA and NBAPA agreed to begin mediation with George Cohen, the federal mediator who successfully assisted the NFL to negotiate its labor dispute. Id. Though several issues were up for discussion under the new CBA, the most important was the division of the league’s revenue. Under the 2005-2011 agreement, players had received 57% of basketball related income (BRI). Id. Facing financial hardships during the recent economic recession, the league granted loans to keep teams in its smaller markets afloat, and was adamant about increasing its share of the BRI to recover these costs and establish a stronger financial situation for the future. Id. NBA players offered a scheme whereby the BRI would be split 53/47 between players and owners. NBA Commissioner David Stern, negotiating on behalf of team owners, demanded a 50/50 BRI split. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks Break Off. Threatening November Games, The New York Times, (Oct 20, 2011), nytimes.com.

The league claimed it needed the extra 3% to break even on revenue. Players were concerned that they would set a dangerous precedent for future CBAs if they came down from their already reduced proposed scheme of a 53/47 split. The potential money involved added up to $1 billion over the course of a ten year agreement. Id.

Hunter and the NBAPA gambled that, by acquiescing to the NBA’s requests on issues such as contract lengths and free agency earlier in negotiations, the players would find themselves in a better position to obtain a more favorable share of BRI in the latter stages. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks Stall and More Games Are Cancelled, The New York Times, (Oct 28, 2011), nytimes.com. The gamble did not pay off for Hunter. By
making these early concessions, the players had given up issues to trade with later in discussing revenue sharing. Having already reached agreement on smaller issues, Stern positioned the league to capitalize on its stronger bargaining position.

Without putting a proposal on the table by a self-imposed October 28th deadline, and by cancelling games through the month of November, Stern showed the players that the owners were resolute in their position and unwilling to back down. *Id.* While their counterparts in the NFL had revealed the secret purchasing of “lockout insurance” which would pay the players in the event of a lockout, Stern’s show of force was unmatched by NBA players. Mediation reached an impasse as neither side was willing to move from its proposed revenue share. Howard Beck, *Talks Stall.* On November 13th, Stern sent a letter to NBA players directly, asking them to approve a CBA passed by owners based on their offer of a 50/50 BRI split. The following day the players unanimously voted down the proposal in a strong showing of solidarity. *NBA lockout timeline.* Though this vote mitigated the effects of Stern’s attempt to grab power, it led to another standstill in CBA negotiations.

Just as it seemed that the entire season would be cancelled, internal and external pressures breathed new life into negotiations. Though both sides continued to pursue legal maneuvers in court, players were still not collecting payments under their contracts; league finances were being further frustrated with lost revenue from cancelled games; and the Occupy Wall Street movement contextualized fan frustrations against the wealthy owners in a public relations battle. Furthermore, the league risked losing support from its fans, who pointed to the successful NFL mediation as a model for the NBA to amicably resolve its dispute.

In an effort to save the season, owners and players resumed negotiations and quickly reached a tentative “handshake agreement” on November 26th, ending the lockout and creating a shortened season to tipoff on Christmas Day. *Id.* On December 8, 2011, players and owners signed a ten-year CBA, allowing both parties an “opt out” option after the sixth year. As is frequently the case in negotiation, the side willing to walk away from the table can wield this power to pressure the other side into an agreement. By showing that they were willing to cancel games, and potentially the entire season, the league compelled its players into giving ground on their biggest issue, resulting in the players yielding to the NBA’s demand of a 50/50 BRI split.

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